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The mid-seventeenth century turn to moralism in English Protestant theology – exemplified 
here by ‘Ignorance’ in Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress – involved a clear rejection of the 
Calvinistic doctrine of the ‘internal testimony’ of scripture.  The upshot was the emergence of 
a religious impulse that emphasised the salience of a ‘rational account’ of scripture’s 
credibility.  The shift is conventionally traced through Richard Hooker, William Chillingworth, 
and the Cambridge Platonists. Hooker was, however, more Calvinist and Chillingworth more 
Laudian than has been recognised.  The Cambridge Platonists and their ‘latitudinarian’ 




In the later pages of Part One of Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s progress (1678), Christian and his friend 
Hopeful are dogged by Ignorance, a ‘very brisk Lad’1 who comes into the road from the country 
of Conceit.  Ignorance is a specimen of a familiar type: the cheerfully Pelagian ‘civil’ or ‘moral 
man’ repeatedly encountered in godly literature.2   At his first encounter with Christian, he 
boasts that ‘I know my Lords will and I have been a good Liver: I pay every man his own; I 
Pray, Fast, pay Tithes and give Alms.’3  Readers of Bunyan’s Grace abounding to the chief of 
sinners (1666) might have recalled that Bunyan had himself been ‘a brisk talker’ during the 
superficially religious period preceding his authentic religious conversion.4 
Ignorance is, then, a stock character.  But he is not without sophistication.  At his second 
encounter with Christian, he hotly denies that ‘I am such a fool, as to think God can see no 
2 
 
further then I; or that I would come to God in the best of my performances’, recognising instead 
that ‘I must believe in God for justification.’  Elaborating on this point, he gives a surprisingly 
careful confession of his faith: 
I believe that Christ died for sinners, and that I shall be justified before God from  
the curse, though his gracious acceptance of my obedience to his Law.  Or thus, 
Christ makes my Duties that are Religious, acceptable to His Father by vertue of 
his Merits, and so shall I be justified.5 
Ignorance thus retains the Reformation principle that it is Christ and Christ alone who merits 
justification; under cover of insistence on this Protestant position, he has, however, departed 
from Reformed theology in treating God’s acceptance of man’s obedience as the defining 
moment of the justifying process. 
In doing so, he was in line with academic fashion.  The Calvinistic Oxford theologian 
Thomas Tully complained that this reliance on the merits of Christ’s works (as opposed to a 
reliance upon the works themselves) was ‘the chief and most crowd-pleasing (popularis) refuge 
of all our Enemies’.6   As Bunyan knew, however, this popular manoeuvre had only fairly 
recently become available to mainstream English Protestant opinion; it was, after all, 
incompatible with any natural reading of the Church of England’s Article XIII, which held that 
works performed before justification were ‘not pleasant to God’ and had ‘the nature of sin’.7  
Down to the end of James’s reign, a broad-based theological consensus – supported, for 
example, by Lancelot Andrewes - had held that it was Christ’s works as imputed to the sinner 
– not man’s works as supported by Christ’s merits - that were the ‘formal cause’ of 
justification.8  Bunyan was just re-stating this old-fashioned orthodoxy when he made Christian 
tell a shocked and baffled Ignorance that 
true Justifying Faith puts the soul (as sensible of its lost condition by the Law) upon 
flying for refuge unto Christs righteousness: (which righteousness of his is not an 
act of grace, by which he maketh for Justification, thy obedience accepted with 
God, but his personal obedience to the Law, in doing and suffering for us, what that 




Bunyan was well aware, of course, of the anxiety that typically motivated the new 
attitudes: Ignorance is made to side-step the theology involved by pointing to the threat of 
antinomian excesses, ‘for what matter how we live, if we may be Justified by Christs personal 
righteousness from all, when we believe it?’  Christian replies, as might have been expected, 
that ‘Ignorance is thy name and thou also art ignorant of the true effects of saving faith in this 
righteousness of Christ’10 (that is, of the better behaviour that is the consequence of the 
completed act of justification).  On Bunyan’s account of the matter, the same kind of anxiety 
was readily provoked when unconditional saving grace was framed as saving knowledge.  
Hopeful is made to follow up on Christian’s exposition with an enquiry about revelation: ‘Ask 
him if he ever had Christ revealed him from Heaven’.  Ignorance is immediately hostile: 
‘What!’ he says, ‘are you a man for revelations!’  He is not appeased by Hopeful’s supporting 
argument that ‘Christ is so hid in God from the natural apprehensions of all flesh, that he cannot 
by any man be savingly known, unless God the Father reveals him to them’, which he describes 
as ‘but the fruit of distracted braines’.11 
Here too, he was attacking an important element of what had previously been the 
orthodox position.  The point that is at issue between Ignorance and Hopeful is whether an 
authentic (as opposed to a delusory and temporary) conversion requires, on God’s side, a 
special act of revelation.  Their exchange should be read in the light of the passage in Grace 
abounding where Bunyan records that his mentor, the Baptist John Gifford, 
made it much his business to deliver the People of God from those false and 
unsound rests that by Nature we are prone to take and make to our Souls; he pressed 
us to take special heed that we took not up any truth upon trust, as from this or that 
or another man or men, but to cry mightily to God that he would convince us of the 
reality thereof, and set us down therein by his own Spirit in the holy Word; for, 
said he, if you do otherwise, when temptations come, if strongly, you not having 
received them with evidence from Heaven, will find you want that help and 
strength now to resist, as once you thought you had.12 
 
Thus the evidence from heaven is scriptural evidence; though truths must be received from 
God, they must be picked out by the spirit in the holy word; the tightness of the link between 
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the spirit and the text explains why saving knowledge is a personal revelation, but not a 
manifestation of mere ‘enthusiasm’. 
This middle way was an expression of the Calvinist belief in the ‘internal testimony’ of 
the holy spirit – that is, the spirit working in and through the words of scripture on those who 
were predestined to have justifying faith (though not, of course, on others).  This witness was 
distinct from such ‘external’ testimony as the judgements of the institutional church, the 
confirmation offered by miracles and prophecies, and even the text’s style and coherence.  
Because it was in scripture that the holy spirit spoke, the text could be said to be autopistos: 
self-authenticating (a term originally drawn from Calvin’s own discussion).13  Although the 
spirit’s message could be seen as ‘revelation’  - Calvin himself referred to internal testimony 
as a caelestis revelatio14 - the substance of what was revealed had a public character contrasting 
with the private (because non-scriptural) content of genuinely ‘enthusiastic‘ claims to 
inspiration.15  In an early work directed against Quakers, Bunyan contrasted ‘what the Spirit of 
the Lord bears witness of according to the Scriptures’ – that is ‘Christ without’ - with the non-
scriptural ‘Christ within’ appealed to by Quakers and Ranters.16 
In the minds of its defenders, the doctrine of the spirit’s internal testimony was thus a 
way of guarding against subjectivism while treating faith as knowledge received direct from 
God.  It was indeed the linchpin of an intellectual structure connecting the public occasion of 
salvific intervention (the sermon preached on scripture) with the essential privacy of an 
experience conceived as God’s action-in-Man (as opposed to Man’s action-supported-by-God). 
The most careful Restoration defence of Calvin’s view (by the leading congregationalist John 
Owen) presumes that ‘Faith Divine’ requires a ‘Supernatural Illumination’ and that 
’Supernatural Revelation is the only Objective cause and means of Supernatural 
Illumination’.17  Thus the ‘Ministry of the Word’ – that is, the puritan sermon on some specific 
text – was ‘the mean which God hath appointed for the Declaration and striking home the 
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Testimony which the Holy Spirit gives in the Scripture to its Divine Original’.18 Owen was 
clear that what he was asserting was not the need for supplementary and assisting grace (he 
thought that ‘no Divine, Ancient or Modern, Popish or Protestant’ had ever actually denied the 
need for such assistance).19  Rather, he was insisting that faith was of its nature ‘an Assent upon 
Testimony, and consequently Divine Faith is an Assent upon Divine Testimony’.20   In other 
words, the distinguishing feature of ’divine faith’ was not that it was human faith supported by 
God’s grace, but that it was an assent to God’s unmediated witness.  He noted, however, that 
‘some are ready to apprehend that this Retreat unto a Spirit of Revelation, is but a pretence to 
discard all rational Arguments, and to introduce Enthusiasm into their room.’21 
Such people shared the attitude ascribed to Ignorance.  In Owen’s more technical 
language, these were thinkers who rejected the previously orthodox doctrine that the spirit’s 
testimony supplied the ‘formal object’ of a salvific faith: that is, the object into which such 
faith must be ‘resolved’.22  There was, however, no need to put the matter in this way to see 
that the shift involved a fundamental transformation in the accounts that were usually given of 
religious practices, and therefore, in the long term, in the kind of power relations that such 
accounts subverted or supported.  When justification was conceived as the transmission of 
knowledge, the excision of revelation from its position at the heart of the salvific process 
removed an idea with some obvious subversive potential: God’s act-in-Man (which might 
subvert conventional social order) was being replaced by Man’s act-assisted-by-God.  As we 
shall see, the upshot was that the spirit’s function of authenticating scripture was taken over by 
a human ‘rational account’.  The exercise of reason acquired a new centrality to English 
Protestant thinking, with consequences that included a distinctive stress on the religious duty 
of being rational 
When seen from this perspective, the combination of ideas ascribed to Ignorance 
encapsulates a problem of great significance.  Ignorance is a fiction, but the purpose of that 
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fiction was to describe opinions that were usually held as a package.  As we shall see, there are 
good grounds for thinking that Bunyan had a real individual in mind – an individual, what was 
more, who was a conscious spokesman for innovative ‘latitudinarian’ attitudes.  In Bunyan’s 
presentation, it is implied that such ideas are widely influential, even, it is suggested, among 
those thought of by themselves and others as members in good standing of the puritan 
subculture.  Hopeful laments that ‘Alas, there are abundance in our Town in his condition; 
whole Families, yea, whole Streets, (and that of Pilgrims [i.e.puritans] too.’23  When Ignorance 
is damned (on the last page of Part One of Pilgrim’s Progress), the narrator is made to observe 
that ‘I saw that there was a way to Hell, even from the Gates of Heaven as well as from the 
City of Destruction’.24  This article offers a context that makes sense of his remark, explaining, 
in particular, how writers of puritan backgrounds came to be hostile towards ’revelations’. 
In doing so, it offers an angle of attack on an important problem that is seldom squarely 
faced.  It is not hard to understand the grounds for the rejection of the old theory of imputation.  
The cost of a theology that emphasises that God’s grace is in no way contingent on anything 
that human beings actually do is a harsh theory of predestination that leaves the decision to 
save or to reject entirely in God’s hands.  In other words, abandonment of this theology can 
fairly be seen as an aspect of the abandonment of Calvinistic theories about predestination in 
favour of more liberal (loosely ‘Arminian’) views that based election partly on God’s foresight 
of man’s faith (conceived of as a form of independent human effort).  One could, however, 
readily imagine a position that had retained what might be called the informational aspect of 
‘internal testimony’ alongside an Arminian view of human agency.  An adequate account of 
the history involved must show why this attractive path was not in fact adopted, at least within 
the mainstream of the Restoration church. 
The problem, then, is not so much why Calvinism declined, but why its successor 
religion, in English circumstances, was generally rationalist and not fideist.  A more careful 
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and less Whiggish intellectual history would explain this without reference to a rationalist 
impulse; if the value set on reason is to be the explanandum, it cannot also be the explanans.  
The analysis presented here seeks to avoid this pitfall.  In offering a narrative of the 
abandonment of the idea that scripture can authenticate itself, it traces a development within 
theology, that is, within a complex but a rule-bound way of talking that was at home, if 
anywhere, in universities.  The outline of this narrative may seem familiar: it focuses on three 
writers – Richard Hooker (1564-1600), William Chillingworth (1602-44), and the so-called 
‘Cambridge Platonist’ Benjamin Whichcote (1609-1683) – who play a prominent role in most 
conventional accounts of English clerical culture’s path away from Calvinism.25  In each case, 
however, attention to the theology requires a new account of the interplay of forces from which 




In speaking about Richard Hooker – the natural starting point of any attempt to re-tell this 
particular story - it is best to begin with a minor and somewhat atypical work: his Learned and 
comfortable sermon of the certaintie and perpetuitie of faith in the elect.  In its present form, 
the Learned and comfortable sermon is a product of his quarrel with the puritan Walter Travers, 
who was his fellow-preacher at the Temple Church in London.  At the climax of this conflict, 
in 1586, Travers denounced him to the Privy Council for various allegedly non-Protestant 
opinions.  One such doctrine was Hooker’s assertion ‘That the assurance of thinges which we 
beleeve by the word is not so certeyne as of that we perceyve by sense.’26  Hooker’s defence of 
this idea was simple: 
And is it as certeyne?  Yea I taughte as I hope he hym selfe I trust woulde not denye 
that the thinges which God does promyse in his word are surer unto us then any 
thinge we touche handle or see, but are we so sure and certeyne of them?  if we be, 
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why does God so often prove his promises unto us as he doth by arguments taken 
from our own sensible experiences.27 
 
In circulating copies of the Learned and comfortable sermon, he was supplying the context of 
this line of argument. 
In making his case he appealed to an established scholastic distinction between 
‘certainty of evidence’ and ‘certainty of adherence’.  According to Hooker, the former is 
subjective certitude: 
Certainty of evidence wee call that, when the mind doth assent to this or that; not 
because it is true in it selfe, but because the truth therof is clear, because it is 
manifest unto us.28 
 
In ordinary life, this kind of certainty is common.  It is ‘evident’, for example, that ‘a part of 
any thing is lesse then the whole, the mind is constrayned to say this is true.’29  In ‘matters of 
fayth’, however, ‘that which wee see by the light of grace...is not to us so evidently certain, as 
that which sense or the light of nature will not suffer a man to doubt of.’30  This was the doctrine 
Travers had complained of.  But certainty of adherence is rather different: ‘certaintie of 
adherence is when the hart doth cleave and stick unto that which it doth believe.’31  In other 
words, it has a motivational component: it is the heart’s response to the experience of a good.  
This certainty of adherence is irremovable:  
Even then when the evidence which he hath of the trueth is so small that it greaveth 
him to feel his weaknes in assenting thereunto; yeat there is in him such a sure 
adharence to that which he doth but faintly and fearfully believe, that his spirit 
having once truly tasted the heavenly sweetnes thereof, all the world is not able 
quite and cleane to remove him from it.32 
 
Hooker was well aware that this might cause a pastoral problem: the fainthearted Christian 
assailed by a doubt would deduce from his present condition that he had never known the 
heavenly sweetness.  But he had a consoling response: 
Be it that they are faithles and without beliefe.  But are they not greeved with ther 
unbeliefe?...Whence cometh this but from a secret love and liking which they have 
of those thinges that are beleeved.  No man can love the thinges which in his own 
opinion are not.  And if they thinke those thinges to be which they show that they 
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love when they desire to beleeve them; then must it needs be that by desiring to 
beleev they prove them selves to be true beleevers.33 
 
Thus the evidence/adherence distinction did not distinguish certainty that has a rational 
grounding from certainty produced by other methods, but certainty that is subjectively manifest 
(whether or not it has a rational grounding) from certainty known from the secret ‘love or 
liking’ whose presence is deducible precisely from our doubts.  In consequence, it was a basis 
for a powerful critique of puritan reliance on subjective confidence.  Beliefs about one’s status 
are merely ‘evidence’; they have nothing to do with ‘adherence’.  ‘Let them beware’, Hooker 
pronounced, ‘who challeng to them selves a strength which they have not least they lose the 
comfortable support of that weaknes which in deed they have.’34 In a brilliant inversion of 
conventional ideas, he held that this kind of assurance was incompatible with a theology of 
imputation: if anyone achieved true certainty of evidence, then he would have a perfect faith 
that would in turn give rise to a perfect righteousness: ‘and then what need wee the 
righteousness of Christ?  his garment is superfluous, wee may be honourably clothed with our 
owne robes if it be thus.’35   
From the perspective of our larger story about the increasing value set on individual 
reason, there are thus three points worth noting about this early text.  First, it took the 
commonsensical position that the Bible itself appeals to extra-biblical experience: the sacred 
text supposes that ordinary ‘sensible knowledge’ can play some role in bringing the Christian 
soul to faith.  But secondly, it held that this sensible knowledge is at best ‘certainty of 
evidence’; it does not bring us certainty of ‘adherence’.  Thirdly, it showed that his ideas on 
this particular question were bound up with commitment to Reformed theology: belief in 
‘perpetuity of faith in the elect’ required his strong distinction between mere ‘evidence’ (a 
purely subjective condition which is apt to fluctuate) and ‘adherence’ (which is altogether 
irremovable).  In other words, the statement that Travers complained of – a downgrading of 
the force of subjective conviction – is actually connected with the Calvinistic view that no 
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regenerate person can lose justifying faith (thus the stock example - David - was still regenerate 
when he was committing adultery and murder).  As it happens, there are good grounds for 
believing that Hooker was sincere in his attachment to this doctrine.  Even in the Dublin 
fragments, replies to a puritan critic composed at the end of his life, he stuck to the view that 
all those who will finally be saved have ‘perpetuitie of inward grace’, that is, that they possess 
it without any interruption from the moment of their first regeneration.36 
It is against the background of this sustained commitment to perpetual adherence that 
one should read Hooker’s discussion in the third book Of the lawes of ecclesiastical polity 
(1593).  The Lawes is of course a polemic against those puritans who thought that full 
instructions for governing the church could readily be found within the Bible.  Hooker by 
contrast argued that there are principles that God has issued for our guidance that are and have 
to be derived from extra-scriptural sources.  As Catholic polemicists had often pointed out, the 
Bible’s own authority looks like a good example.  Hooker’s carefully-worded discussion of the 
subject was written in awareness of this Catholic argument and therefore of the importance of 
not endorsing it.  He started by conceding that ‘scripture teacheth us that saving truth which 
God hath discovered unto the world by revelation, and it presumeth us taught otherwise that it 
self is divine and sacred.’37  He noted that ‘some’ (that is, Catholics) maintained that ‘to learn 
[this], we have no other way then onely tradition’, and was quite happy to admit that ‘the first 
outward motive leading men so to esteeme of the Scripture is the authority of God’s Church.’38  
But this preliminary ‘outward motive’ was only the beginning of a fairly complex process.  
When we subsequently ‘read or hear the misteries thereof’, we find our existing inducement to 
believe is further strengthened, when ‘the very thing hath ministred further reason.’39  
Elsewhere in the Lawes, he characterised human testimony as ‘the key which openeth the dore 
of entrance into the knowledge of scripture’,40 but the same chapter went on to note 
(approvingly) that ‘that which we have necessary reason for, yea, that which we have seen with 
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our eies is not thought so sure as that which the scripture of God teaches.’41  In other words, he 
treated human witness as a ‘motive’ that can at best occasion a superior kind of knowledge. 
There was, however, an important role for human reason.  Once faith has been 
established, infidels and atheists may ‘give occasion to sift what reason there is, whereby the 
testimony of the church concerning scripture, and our own persuasion which Scripture itself 
hath confirmed, may be proved a thing infallible.’42  Hooker himself appealed to the practice 
of the Fathers to show that infidels could be confuted ‘by arguments such as unbeleevers them 
selves must needs thinke reasonable, if they judged therof as they should.’43  But there was 
nothing here that any Calvinist need deny.    As the Dublin fragments put it to his puritan 
opponents, ‘the evidence which good things have for themselves, if reason were diligent to 
search out, may be soundlie and safely taught without contradiction to any syllable…in those 
sentences of holy Scripture by you alleged, concerning the actuall disabilitie of reason and 
will...’44 
His earliest defender William Covell was thus on firm ground in insisting that the 
‘scriptures in themselves’ have ‘inward witnes from that spirit, which is the author of all truth’ 
and that the witness of the church is supplemented by ‘the testimony of the Holy-ghost, without 
which the commendation of the Church were of little value.’45  Hooker himself was reverently 
agnostic about the mechanisms through which the spirit worked: even its ‘ordinary’ operations 
were ‘things secret and undiscernable’, though he cautioned against believing or doing ‘any 
certaine particular thing, as being moved thereto by the spirit’.46  The closest he came to 
abandoning internal testimony was to remark that those of his fellow-Protestants who held that 
‘there is no proof but by the testimony of the spirit’ were not intending to exclude ‘all force’ 
from human reason, but thought that ‘other motives and inducements, be they never so strong 
and consonant unto reason, are notwithstanding uneffectual in themselves.’47 In other words, 
he claimed there was a Protestant consensus that reason could be said to have some ’force’ in 
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proving scripture, but that the spirit made that force ’effectual’.  The ambiguity in this position, 
which gave rise to developments that he might not have welcomed, was not whether the spirit’s 
testimony was required, but whether its acknowledged role in bringing about adherence was 
confined to ensuring salvific reception of the truth (as opposed to the active transmission of 
some kind of knowledge).  The same ambiguity surfaced in the thought of William Laud. 
Laud’s major anti-Catholic work The conference with Fisher (1624; amplified 1639) 
included a tortured discussion of a complex compound view most notable for insisting that ‘the 
Voyce and Tradition’ of the primitive church is ‘Divine not aliquo modo, in a sort, but simply’; 
and therefore that ‘the word of God from them, is of like Validity, written, or delivered.’48  He 
conceded that the present church induces attention to scripture,49 but he defended Hooker by 
maintaining that ‘the first Inducer to believe is not by and by either the Principall Motive, or 
the chiefe and last Object of Beliefe.’50  No one expected reason to prove scripture, but only to 
‘enable us to disproove that which misguided men conceive against it’.51  Thus ‘we Resolve 
[Faith] onely into Prime Tradition Apostolicall, and Scripture itself.’52  There were, however, 
two significant shifts here.  Notwithstanding the way that he limited the role assigned to reason, 
one was that he excluded the spirit’s testimony from answering the question ‘how the Scripture 
may be proposed as a credible Object, fit for Beliefe.53  The other was the promotion of 
apostolical tradition to the same status as the text of scripture.   But the latter was an obstacle 
to any tendency to grounding belief primarily in reason; he had no interest, after all, in 
grounding tradition in reason.  Like Covell, Laud insisted that human testimony was only, at 
most, the occasion for justifying faith.  He pointed out that Hooker had described it as ‘the Key 
which opens the doore of entrance into the knowledge of the scriptures’ and that this was a 
different thing from ‘the ground of our Beliefe.’54  In this, as in other respects, he was a very 
careful thinker who was, for the most part, mindful of a Calvinistic framework even when he 
was venturing beyond it.55  The misunderstanding of Hooker that has since been dominant - 
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transforming human witness into more than just a ‘motive‘ - did not become available to people 




Perhaps the first and certainly the most significant of those who were willing and able to read 
Hooker in this way was the culturally pivotal figure of William Chillingworth.  Chillingworth’s 
forceful treatise The religion of Protestants (1637) explicitly rejected the old Reformed 
position: though he pronounced that God might work a ‘certainty of adherence, beyond a 
certainty of evidence’, he flatly denied that the former was required for salvation.  He went on 
to reject what he described as ‘the false Principle, That it is in vain to believe the Gospel of 
Christ, with such a kind or belief of assent as they yield to other matters of Tradition.’56  It was, 
after all, ‘an unreasonable Master, who requires a stronger assent to his conclusions, then his 
arguments deserve.’57    To do so was ‘to make God a Tyrant, and to say that he requires us 
certainly to attain that end, for the attaining whereof we have no certain meanes.’58  Moreover, 
the very idea of a ‘perfect rule’ implied something ‘so evident, that it needs no interpretation’.59  
It followed that the necessary credenda were simple propositions that are found within the 
Bible.  The only controversies that the Bible could not settle were those that set out to discover 
the status of scripture itself, ‘which cannot be determined but by naturall reason, the only 
principle, beside Scripture, which is common to Christians.’60 
Chillingworth follows Hooker in the standard narrative.  But like Hooker, he has often 
been poorly understood.  In Hooker’s case, the usual source of the misunderstanding has been 
an under-estimate of his Reformed credentials; in Chillingworth’s, it is a failure to grasp his 
personal debt to the new style of churchmanship we know as Laudian.  Although he tried the 
patience of his fellow Laudians, most notably by doubting trinitarian orthodoxy, they 
14 
 
consistently and rightly understood him as a somewhat deviant ally in what they were trying to 
do.  In particular, he accepted and applauded their ceremonialism, their use of such terms as 
‘sacrifice’ and ‘altar’, and their tolerance or approval of Arminian departures from the 
Reformed theology of grace.61  At the end of his life, he was also an ardent royalist.  
Chillingworth was thus the product of a factional milieu whose increasing veneration for the 
patristic church reflected and encouraged a regard for visible churches; within this culture, the 
ideal was a reading of the Fathers untainted by Reformed dogmatic systems. 
In 1630, Chillingworth dramatically converted from Protestantism to Catholicism.62  The 
letter he wrote to his intimate friend Gilbert Sheldon relied on what had now become a standard 
argument: 
1. Whether it be not evident from Scripture, and Fathers, and Reason; from the 
goodness of God, and the necessity of Mankind; that there must be some one 
Church infallible in matters of Faith. 
2.  Whether there be any other Society of men in the World, besides the Church of 
Rome, that either can upon good warrant, or at all, challenge to itself the privilege 
of Infallibility in matter of Faith.63 
 
 This letter reveals his commitment to two basic premises with which he expected Sheldon at 
least to sympathise.  One is the unsurprising if unCalvinist position that we can deduce from 
God’s goodness that He has made provision even for fallen man to have some realistic chance 
of finding saving knowledge; the other is the strikingly unProtestant belief that it is a ‘society 
of men’ that offers guidance.  As we shall see, he never stopped believing either premise. 
The outline of his subsequent development is well-known.64 After an unsuccessful stay 
at Douai, he was persuaded to return to England, in part through correspondence with his 
godfather William Laud.  But his preferment in the Church of England was delayed by a 
number of scruples that still impeded him from re-subscribing to its Articles.  The studies that 
had led him to abandon his belief in the consistency of Roman doctrine had drawn attention to 
the fact that the pre-Nicene Fathers appeared, if anything, to support the case for Arianism.   At 
the very least, this fact implied that the confident threats of hellfire in the Athanasian creed 
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were altogether unacceptable.  His brilliantly accomplished anti-Catholic polemic was 
composed while he was in this intermediate condition.  It is famous for maintaining that 
infallibility requires an infallible foundation.  No such infallible grounding could be found for 
the papists’ pretensions.  It was, however, possible to reach what he described as a ‘moral 
certainty’ of the reliability of scripture. 
This biographical story can obviously be read as shaped by an enthusiasm for the power 
of reason, especially in the light of the contemporary perception that he borrowed from the 
Socinian Joannes Volkelius.65  It is, however, worth noting that Volkelius’s position was shaped 
by a fideist impulse that seems completely foreign to Chillingworth’s ideas.  Volkelius believed 
that the evidence available to Christians falls well short of the certainty achieved by 
mathematics, but that the epistemic gap is to be celebrated.  A mathematical certainty has been 
denied to Christians so as to leave a place for reward and punishment.  Thus Christian doctrine 
functions as a touchstone by which to distinguish the vicious from those of virtuous 
inclinations.   This would not, he believed, be possible ’if we make the truth of Christ’s teaching 
as manifest to all as if it could be be seen by the eyes or fondled by the hands.’66.  At all events, 
Chillingworth’s argument rejected both internal and external testimony.  He held that the latter 
‘may conclude the negative very strongly, to wit, that such a book cannot come from God 
because it containes irreconcilable contradictions, but the affirmative it cannot conclude, 
because the contents of a book may be all true, and yet the book not written by divine 
inspiration.’67  All that remained was ‘the testimony of the Primitive Christians’.68  He was 
quite happy to accept ‘the Tradition of all ages’ as a conclusive answer to all questions he might 
raise.69  Unfortunately, that tradition was exiguous. As he put it in a famous peroration, the 
study of church history revealed no consensus. On almost every question, there were  
Popes against Popes, Councells against Councells, some Fathers against others, the 
same Fathers against themselves, a consent of Fathers of one age against a consent 
of Fathers of another age, the Church of one age against the Church of another age.  
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Traditive interpretations of scripture are pretended, but there are few or none to be 
found.  No tradition but only of scripture can derive itself from the fountain…70 
 
This celebrated passage is not so much, however, an attack upon tradition as a severe 
insistence that only one tradition – that is, the tradition of scripture – can claim to be certain.  
A little later, he confirmed that ‘Universal, never-failing tradition assures me that [Scripture] 
was by the admirable supernatural worke of God confirm’d to be the work of God.’71  If this 
was a rational judgement, it was no less an assertion of church authority.  He soon acquired 
readers – most notably, perhaps, the puritan leader Richard Baxter – who took it that the 
tradition to which appeal was made consisted in reports of confirmatory miracles.72  But 
Chillingworth’s own argument was probably less crude.  He remarked that ‘if the doctrine of 
scripture were not as good...as the Miracles by which it was confirm’d, were great, I should 
want one main pillar of my faith, and for want of it, I feare should be much stagger’d in it.’73  
Moreover, the debate he was engaged in involved him addressing the problem of defining the 
canon of scripture.  He took it for granted that the status of specific books should be settled by 
‘the testimonies of the ancient churches’.74 
When Chillingworth is read against this intellectual background, it become clearer why 
his work was accepted and rewarded.  As we have seen, Laud defended unwritten traditions 
‘of which kinde this, That the Bookes of Scripture are the Word of God, is the most generall 
and uniforme.’75  Chillingworth could be taken to be a Laudian who took an eccentrically 
minimal view of what tradition might prove.  In consequence, a Laudian could appreciate his 
assault on the infallibility of the present church of Rome without dropping the view that the 
primitive church was, other things being equal, normative.  This seems, at all events, to have 
been the view of Henry Hammond, the intellectual leader of the rigorous conformists during 
their decades of adversity.76  The closest thing to a conformist summa, John Pearson’s 
Exposition of the creed (1659), implicitly rejected the Chillingworthian view, distinguishing 
‘humane faith’ of a Chillingworthian type from the ‘divine faith’ that responds to scriptural 
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revelation.77  In the end, it was puritan thinkers who made the idea of a duty to use individual 





When we turn to Benjamin Whichcote and his famous correspondence with his friend and 
former tutor Anthony Tuckney, we find ourselves in an altogether different cultural world.  The 
facts are sufficiently striking to deserve some emphasis.  During the 1630s, Cambridge politics 
had been shaped by conflict between Laudian and non-Laudian conformists.  During the 1640s, 
in Cambridge as elsewhere, both of these groups discovered that they were royalists; whatever 
their opinions about Arminianism, most of the natural leadership of academic Cambridge were 
loyal both to monarchy and to episcopacy.78  In consequence, a relatively small minority - the 
heirs to the authentic Cambridge puritan tradition of Laurence Chaderton, William Whitaker, 
William Perkins, and John Preston - was propelled to a position of unchallenged dominance.79  
The Arminian stronghold of Queens’ was left virtually empty, and its fellowship was 
repopulated from Emmanuel, the college with the strongest living puritan tradition. 
This background is important, because prosperity revealed a surprising fact about this 
little group: it was itself divided and a number of its members - though ‘godly’ in demeanour 
and in their politics - were theologically Arminian.  Puritanism considered as an identity was 
combined with a rejection of predestinarian doctrines that earlier puritan thinkers had regarded 
as essential.  At some point between 1644 and 48, the young Simon Patrick (a future bishop of 
Ely who was then a conventionally godly undergraduate in Queens’) confided in his tutor his 
doubts about 
the doctrine of absolute predestination; which I told him always seemed to me very 
hard, and I could never answer the objections against it, but was advised by divines 
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to silence carnal reason.  At which he fell a laughing, and told me they were good 
and sound reasons which I had objected against that doctrine, and made such a 
representation of the nature of God to me, and of his good-will to men in Christ 
Jesus, as quite altered my opinion.80 
 
The man who did the laughing was not a Laudian, but an ex-fellow of Emmanuel, the highly 
respected John Smith, a member in good standing of the Westminster Assembly.  Together 
with Ralph Cudworth, Benjamin Whichcote, and Henry More, he has of course been known as 
a ‘Cambridge Platonist’, but the label, though defensible, is needlessly distracting.  What these 
figures had in common was a cultural identity that made them politically favourable to 
parliamentarianism – enough so to accept the posts of their royalist ex-colleagues - combined 
with increasing commitment to a moralistic standpoint. 
This was the local context of the Whichcote-Tuckney letters.  Tuckney had been a 
youthful fellow of Emmanuel during the period in which he had been Whichcote’s tutor.  He 
later served as curate to the non-separating congregationalist John Cotton, taking over as 
incumbent in the church in Boston, England when Cotton moved to Boston, Massachusetts.  In 
due course, he played a significant part in the Westminster Assembly.  In 1645, he was a fairly 
natural choice to be the Master of Emmanuel, though he seems to have stayed in London till 
1648, when he was chosen as Vice-Chancellor.81  When he returned, he had high hopes, and 
happy memories of his gifted pupil, having heard that ‘when times were very evil, God in his 
mercie kept your spirit uprighte.’82  But he was disappointed.  In the late 1640s, in Cambridge 
as elsewhere, the old theology of imputation was threatened by the emergence of a puritan 
critique that stigmatised its language as antinomian.83  One of the points at issue was the 
relationship between theology and human reason. 
In 1650, things came to a head at Commencement, when Tuckney preached a sermon 
that in effect defended scholastic procedures against a rising tide of commonsensical literalism 
and personally disputed about the proposition that ‘Articles of faith are not to be constrained 
to the measure of human reason.’84 The famous correspondence arose from the next year’s 
19 
 
Commencement, when Whichcote as Vice-Chancellor preached a Commencement sermon, 
recommending (to quote Tuckney’s summary) that ‘we wou’d be confined to Scripture words 
and expressions; in which all parties agree; and not press other forms of words, which are from 
fallible men.’85  Tuckney understandably saw this as a personal attack and wrote to his ex-pupil 
in order to remonstrate.  Their correspondence covers many topics.  But what is most useful 
about it, for present purposes, is the insight that it offers into the highly puritan – indeed, in 
seventeenth-century terms, the ‘enthusiastic’ spirit - in which Whichcote entertained his new 
convictions. 
Tuckney acknowledged that the roots of Whichcote’s attitudes were found within 
Emmanuel’s own culture: 
Whilest you were fellow here, you were cast into the companie of very learned and 
ingenious men; who I fear, at least some of them, studied other authors, more than 
the scriptures…And hence in part hath runne a veine of doctrine; which divers very 
learned and able men, whom from my heart I much honour, are, I fear, too much 
knowen by. – The power of Nature, in Morals, too much advanced – Reason hath 
too much given to itt, in the mysteries of Faith…86 
 
But he suggested Whichcote might also have been swayed by a number of explicitly Arminian 
influences (including, as it happens, Chillingworth). Whichcote insisted in response that ‘trulie 
I have more read Calvine, and Perkins, and Beza; than all the bookes, authors, or names you 
mention.’87  This claim was arguably borne out by the whole character of the position 
Whichcote was defending.  Faced with the menace posed by commonsense Arminianism, it 
was Tuckney who insisted that it was sometimes necessary to offer ‘explications’ in forms of 
words not found within the Bible.88  Whichcote replied that he was confident that the plain 
sense of scripture without human supplement could guarantee a basic orthodoxy.  He said that 
he had used the same interpretative methods in college disputations in 1637 on the charged 




 It was, moreover, Whichcote who had the keener sense of the Almighty’s providential 
guidance. In the third of his four letters, he began to lose control, repeatedly and eloquently 
referring to ‘these times’ in tones that seem remarkable to anyone accustomed to reading his 
respectable post-Restoration sermons.  He tells us, for example, that ‘the times, wherein I live, 
are more to mee than any else: the workes of God in them which I am to discerne, direct in me 
both principle affection and action.’90  Unfortunately, some mistaken people had fallen into 
what he called a ‘spirit of Persecution’ 
And I do believe; that the destroying of this spirit out of the church is a peece of 
the Reformation, which God, in these times of changes, aimes-att: and I feare to 
bee under the power of the anti-character to the work that God is about.91 
 
Whichcote’s treatment of the question of the authority of scripture was an excellent 
example of his general approach.  At first sight, his assumptions appeared traditional: ‘Sacra 
scriptura est autopistos est Deo digna, est Fide digna: it speaks for itt selfe, it recommends itt 
selfe to its subject, itt satisfies the reason of the minde; procures its owne enterteinment, by its 
own excellency.’92  But it emerged that what he meant by the term autopistos was something 
wholly different from the Calvinist conception.  Thus he held that ‘Dignitas et certitudo 
Christianae religionis are not provable by testimonie of scripture but subsequentlye to the 
demonstration of the divine authorite of scripture’.93  There were in his view three different 
ways to achieve this demonstration: the quality of the material, the testimony of the spirit, and 
the deliverances of tradition.  As might have been expected, he passed over the claims of 
tradition in favour of the quality of the material.  The radical step that he took was to downgrade 
the testimony of the Holy Spirit on the grounds that ‘though itt bee triumphant, where it is’, it 
is by contrast ’nothing to him that feels itt not’.  In other words, what might be thought its most 
important feature - the purely private character of the experience - was now seen as a reason 
for denigrating it.  Tuckney appealed to ‘faith’, but Whichcote scornfully responded: 
Itt is but humana credulitas, and not fides divina, till I receeve upon divine 
authoritie: and this I am not negligently to suppose or imagine, but to have it made-
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out to me.  For he that beleeves what God saith; without evidence that God saith it; 
doth not believe God, while hee beleeves the thing that is from God: et eadem 
ratione si contigisset, Alcorrano Turcico credidisset [for the same reason under 
other circumstances would have believed the Turkish Koran] and for evidence 
might have alleged his faith in itt.94 
 
It will be observed that ‘evidence’ has subtly changed its meaning.  If ‘evidence’ is private, it 
can be understood as a person-specific process of ‘making-evident’; if, however, it is public, 
then it must bear its modern sense of undynamic fact.     
The interest and importance of the Whichcote-Tuckney letters is that they cast a light 
upon a moment of transition.  As his rhetoric showed, Whichcote was as ‘puritan’ as Tuckney; 
he had worked out his novelties within a godly setting, and they were informed by a loathing 
of a ‘spirit of Persecution’.  There can be little doubt that he regarded his position as a 
development within, not a departure from, the Cambridge puritanism in which he had been 
trained.  In consequence, it is not at all surprising that those who ensured the reception of 
Chillingworth’s ideas were primarily ex-puritans from Cambridge.  The next generation was 
free of the streak of mysticism that characterised the Platonists’ high view of human reason, 
but their most prosaic outlook was equally hostile to notions that smacked of private 
inspiration.  Their cultural puritanism enabled them to ignore the uncongenial features of the 
Laudian Chillingworth, just as Chillingworth’s Arminianism enabled him to ignore the 
Calvinistic framework of Hooker’s argument. 
 Thus the future archbishop John Tillotson’s development was shaped when he came 
across a copy of The Religion of Protestants.  As his funeral sermon recorded, Tillotson’s 
cultural background was wholly puritan.  As a fellow of Clare, however, in the early 1650s, he 
‘happily fell on Chillingworth’s book, which gave his mind the ply that it held ever after and 
put him on a true scent... yet he still stuck to the strictness of life to which he was bred, and 
retained a just value, and a due tenderness for men of that Persuasion.’95  But the Restoration 
version of the Chillingworthian view was most carefully put by the slightly younger Edward 
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Stillingfleet.96  In 1660, Stillingfleet was ‘presbyterian’ in the sense that that he defended the 
moderate puritan case for a more limited episcopacy.97  Ten weeks before the ejections of St 
Bartholomew’s Day, he published Origines Sacrae, or a rational account of the grounds of 
Christian faith, as to the truth and divine authority of the scriptures and the matters therein 
contained (1662). 
As its title indicated, Stillingfleet’s famous book was a completion of the process by 
which the spirit was replaced by a rational account.  Though he was keen to emphasise thqat 
he did not resolve ‘all Religion into a meer act of reason and knowledge’, he made a sharp 
distinction between two processes: ‘the one is to satisfie man’s minde of the truth of the 
doctrine, the other is to bring them effectually to adhere unto it.’98  Though he appeased 
conservatives by stressing that both processes were needed for justification, he had deprived 
the spirit of the epistemic function that was an essential feature of the Calvinist position.  His 
view of these questions was nonetheless marked by continuities with attitudes presumably 
derived from his puritan background.  Unlike the Laudian Arminians, he tacitly accepted the 
Calvinistic view that justifying faith is of its very nature ‘certain’, indignantly rejecting the 
alternative position that it is ‘a meer probable perswasion’.99  In consequence, the concept of 
‘moral certainty’ that he had taken over from Chillingworth’s treatise was not understood as a 
limiting case of probability.  Instead, it was regarded as the type of certainty that was 
appropriate to the situation: ‘what’, he asked, ‘can it be accounted but temerity and imprudence 
in any to believe a doctrine as true only upon probable inducements?’100  His nascent ethics of 
belief was thus in part an outcome of the survival in his thought of puritan commitments.  The 
same can be said of the nature of the central argument of his next major controversial treatise: 
a Rational account of the grounds of Protestant religion, being a vindication of the Lord 
Archbishop’s relation of a conference (1665).  His defence of Laud’s Relation may well have 
been sincere, but it involved ignoring Laud’s stress upon the church, transforming Laud’s 
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discussion of ‘the ground of our Beliefe ’ – in which reason’s role was modest and fairly 
marginal - into a defence of the ‘rational credibility’ of scripture.101 
The personal trajectory of men like Stillingfleet had given them a message that was not 
available to colleagues who emerged from mainstream conformity.  Without obvious 
exception, these ‘latitudinarians’ were men of godly backgrounds who had held benefices in 
interregnum times.102   Even those of them who were ordained by bishops were liable to be 
classified as being ‘presbyterians’ rather than ‘cavaliers’ (where presbyterian refers to an 
identity to which views on church government were largely incidental).   In other words, they 
fell upon the parliamentarian side of what was primarily a political divide produced by the side-
taking of the first Civil War.  Simon Patrick, for example, continued to be regarded as 
’presbyterian’ long after he had taken the risk of getting episcopal orders103 - a detail that would 
obviously have special interest if he were the ‘S.P.’ who wrote A brief account of the new sect 
of latitude-men (1662). 
The presence of such people in the Restoration church was one of the main reasons for 
its stability, especially when confronted with the Stuart preference for toleration for 
Catholicism.  Although they favoured charity to moderate nonconformists – often though not 
invariably involving ‘comprehension’ - they had no real sympathy with outright toleration.  
Moreover, their minimisation both of the sacraments104 and Christianity’s dogmatic content 
contracted the sphere where the needs of the church might conflict with royal power.  Above 
all, they rejected Calvinist predestination.  Their background had left them ideally placed to 
take from Chillingworth the basis of a simplified and moralistic gospel that had an appeal to 
laymen who were positively hostile to the traditional puritan subculture.105    At all events, the 
‘latitude’ of which they were accused was at first an accusation from a puritan perspective.106 
 No public figure better exemplified this point than Edward Fowler, minister of Northill 
outside Bedford, who held both the views that Bunyan ascribed to Ignorance.  Fowler’s 
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religious background was unquestionably godly; his father and his brother were ejected from 
their livings in 1662, and he himself had briefly refused conformity.  Theologically, however, 
he was a keen supporter of the innovative party.  Although, he obtained his first degree at 
Oxford, he later moved to Cambridge.  It was under Cambridge influence that he wrote a well-
known book: The principles and practice of certain moderate divines of the Church of England 
(1670).  In a manuscript note on his copy, the Calvinistic Oxford academic Thomas Barlow 
remarked that ‘this discourse is a Justification of a Latitudinarian (the word was hatch’d at 
Cambridge, and there you may heare more of it) against the zealous non-Conformists.’107  This 
was a reasonable summary: the criticisms that Fowler was anxious to rebut were virtually all 
ones that might be made by nonconformists.  Moreover, he defended both of the heresies that 
Bunyan subsequently ascribed to Ignorance.  He rejected imputation of Christ’s works (as 
opposed to Christ’s merits)108 and criticised those who made use of an ‘internal testimony, or 
a secret powerful persuasion wrought immediately in the soul of men’ as a proof of the 
authority of scripture. In Fowler’s view, this was ‘as gross a Circle as that we accuse the papists 
of.  For as they prove the scriptures by their Church, and their Church by the Scriptures; so 
these prove the Scriptures by this testimony of the Holy Ghost, but then cannot prove so much 
as that there is any such person, but by the Scriptures.’109 
The following year, he expanded and developed his position in a work whose central 
thesis is expressed in its full title: The design of Christianity; or, a plain demonstration and 
improvement of this proposition, viz. That the enduing men with inward real righteousness or 
true holiness, was the ultimate end of our Saviour’s coming into the world, and is the great 
intendment of his blessed gospel (1671).  But though this was his central theme, he did not fail 
to mention that ‘for our satisfaction whether the Holy Scriptures are Divinely inspired, it is 
necessary that we employ our Reason’, on pain of having ‘no better bottome for our belief of 
the Bible, that the Turks have for theirs of the Alcoran’.110 
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Bunyan felt moved to publish a more or less instant riposte: A defence of the doctrine 
of justification by faith in Christ Jesus (1671).  The substance of this tract, proudly dated ‘From 
Prison’, was a vigorous re-statement of the centrality of justification achieved by imputation.  
Fowler’s position was assailed for neglecting the fact that the holiness that inheres in human 
nature ‘is not the righteousness that justifieth us before God from the curse.’111  But Bunyan 
also noted that it was necessary that ‘those that follow Jesus in his Spirit, must first receive that 
Spirit from Heaven.’.  This spirit was received by ‘applying the Merits of Christ‘ and not ’by 
the Works of the Law, but by the hearing of Faith‘, not ’in the Ministry or Doctrine of Morals, 
but in and by the Ministry of Faith‘, that is, in and by sermons.112  Fowler had gone wrong in 
‘contenting your self to rest within the confines of the humane Nature, acts of reason, as men 
or Creatures only’.113  The book was ‘begun in Ignorance, mannaged with Errour, and ended 
in Blasphemy.’114 
From Bunyan’s perspective, though, Fowler was worse than ignorant; he was an 
exemplification of shifts in attitude in people who had recently been culturally godly.  Bunyan 
regarded Fowler as a ‘glorious Latitudinarian, that can, as to Religion, turn and twist like an 
Eel on the Angle.’115  He was sorry that there were ‘so many that have done Violence to their 
former Light’ and ‘made Shipwrack of their former Faith’.  Though the two men were not 
personally acquainted, ‘yet I have heard as if Blood might pursue you, for your unstable 
Weathercock Spirit.’116  Bunyan thus thought of Fowler as a recent apostate.  It is easy to see 
why he did so.  Fowler’s continuing puritan credentials are shown by the fact that Richard 
Baxter wrote in his defence.117  He went on to become rector of the great puritan parish of St 
Giles Cripplegate and worked to frustrate coercion against moderate dissent.  As late as 1679, 
in his position as holder of a canonry at Gloucester, he organised the smashing of a cathedral 
window that he regarded as idolatrous.118  After the Revolution, he took the radical view that 
William and Mary should be seen as conquerors, whose ‘right’ had been derived from their 
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‘Success in a just War’, though ‘the assuming of it was not by any ways of force or violence, 





By the time of Pilgrim’s Progress, rejection of the testimony of the holy spirit was rapidly 
solidifying into common sense.  The idea of a self-evidencing scriptural revelation had ceased 
to be an aspect of a theory of faith, becoming instead a pathology of theories of knowledge.  
John Locke said little that somebody like Fowler could object to in holding, in a chapter about 
‘Enthusiasm’, that ‘Revelation is natural Reason enlarged by a new set of Discoveries 
communicated by God immediately, which Reason vouches the Truth of, by the Testimony 
and Proofs it gives, that they come from God ’.120  In the long term, this position was plainly 
vulnerable to people who doubted that rational proofs could rest on miracles. Fowler himself 
lived long enough to write a shocked response to Locke’s pupil Shaftesbury’s comment that to 
claim ‘moral certainty’ about a miracle was actually itself a symptom of ‘enthusiasm’.121  But 
the theoretical weakness of his rational religion - the fact that it gave rise to an ethics of belief 
that generated tests it was unlikely to survive – should not distract attention from its practical 
robustness. 
The assumptions that faith must admit of a ‘rational account’ and that evidence, of its 
nature, had a public character lay somewhere near the heart of a new cultural politics that was 
to prove both stable and longlasting.  Though the chronology suggests that this was in part a 
reaction to the supposed ‘enthusiasm’ of the Revolution, it was not primarily a royalist reaction.  
The key to the transition was that the crucial step was largely the work of divines who set out 
from a culturally puritan standpoint.  Precisely because they came from the parliamentarian-
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presbyterian as opposed to the cavalier-episcopalian side of England’s fundamental political 
cleavage, their message was ideally pitched to win mainstream acceptance.  The result was a 
re-drawing of the perimeter within which educated forms of discourse were conducted, with 
consequences including the fruitful prejudice in favour of ideas that could be publicly 
established that played some role in Royal Society science.122  As Bunyan found, re-statements 
of previously orthodox views were not so much refuted as excluded from discussion; Fowler’s 
response to Bunyan’s old-fashioned arguments had the dismissiveness implied by its title: Dirt 
wip’t off (1672).123   The social stability promised by this development no doubt in part accounts 
for its popularity.  But the dramatic change had intellectual preconditions.  At each stage of the 
history this article describes, books were absorbed by readers who were largely ignorant of the 
presuppositions of their authors.  Stillingfleet‘s basic outlook was as far from Chillingworth’s 
as Chillingworth‘s had been from Richard Hooker‘s.  The misapprehensions resulting were 
creative in effect, but they were also symptoms of the contingency that underlay the history of 
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